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Antommaria (2013) steps outside of traditional ethical analysis for compulsory 
vaccination programs for health care personnel (HCP) by utilizing an ethics framework 
for public health to provide a broader examination of justification not only for obligations 
but implementation as well.  Yet, as the author notes, the primary issue in implementing 
these programs is determining the role and scope of exemptions.  While medical 
exemptions are accepted as necessary, Antommaria (2013) insists that conscientious 
objections, both religious and nonreligious, should be allowed after a thorough evaluation 
of their sincerity to ensure their allowance is not exploited.  If the authors had utilized the 
lengthy history of case law covering compulsory vaccination policies they may have seen 
that including conscientious exemptions and evaluating their validity can be difficult, 
administratively cumbersome, and potentially unconstitutional.  Furthermore, vaccination 
jurisprudence has suggested that nonmedical exemptions are not legally required to pass 
constitutional muster due to the public health threat they address and their neutral 
applicability.   
In the case Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court established a three-pronged 
test that has been consistently used to evaluate the constitutionality of laws that are 
challenged under the Establishment Clause, which prohibits the government from passing 
a law respecting an establishment of religion (1971).  To be deemed constitutional the 
law (1) must have a secular purpose, (2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor 
inhibits religion, and (3) must not result in an excessive entanglement of government with 
religion (Sherr 1987).  While this test was created in the context of religious exemptions, 
the Court’s warning of the difficulties that arise with evaluating and establishing what 
beliefs are “bona fide” or “sincerely held” seem applicable to all conscientious exemption 
claims.  Indeed, the complexity in evaluating exemption claims without endorsing certain 
beliefs and not others, or inappropriately entangling the state in religion is why many 
courts have found laws providing exemptions that make the type of evaluations that 
Antommaria is calling for unnecessary at the very least. 
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Antommaria (2013) proposes that the evaluative process distinguish between 
sincere and insincere beliefs, and admits that this largely rests of the individual’s 
credibility and will require the provision of sufficient evidence.  As the court in Sherr v. 
Northport-East Northport Union Free School District stated, this type of evaluation “in 
essence puts the individual on trial for heresy” (1987).  The court accepted that the state 
may desire to limit improper evasion of immunization, but they were troubled by the 
notion that some may be able to avoid the burden simply because the state deemed their 
beliefs more worthy than another’s (Sherr 1987). 
The court in LePage v. State Deptartment of Health found no statutory authority 
to allow the state to judge the sincerity of a conscientious objection, while they made a 
point to question the wisdom in doing so (2001).  For example, they wondered whether a 
belief that had not been held consistently over time should be deemed insincere and merit 
a denial of an exemption request.  After all, does a person need to be able to prove over a 
sustained period of time a particular belief for it to be valid at that moment?  If so, for 
how long and what type of evidence would be deemed sufficient? 
While Antommaria (2013) suggests mechanisms to establish sincerity, they do not 
provide a definitive barometer for what is and is not in fact sincerely held beliefs.  To be 
sure, the difficulty in doing so is why many states have adopted requirements to simply 
file the proper paperwork without evaluating the validity of the beliefs.  Another likely 
factor is the extreme administrative burden created by requiring each individual 
exemption request be evaluated for sincerity.  For hospitals, this would require setting up 
their own tribunals to request and interpret evidence and testimony in determining the 
validity of personal beliefs.  In a hospital, where people need medical attention, it begs 
the question of whether this is the best use of the resources that are likely to be demanded 
to implement this requirement effectively.   
As the court in LePage (2001) stated, to make this type of determination and 
scrutinize personal beliefs, as Antommaria has suggested should be done, calls into 
question the constitutionality of the provision.  In fact, the assessment of sincerity, which 
amounts to endorsing the beliefs of certain individuals and not others, has not been found 
to be legally required and, in some courts, has been labeled unconstitutional.  Throughout 
the compulsory vaccination jurisprudence, courts consistently focus on the public’s 
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health and the need and constitutionality to take measures to protect it.  For example, in 
the seminal case Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court held compulsory 
vaccinations constitutional because there is no “absolute right in each person to be, at all 
times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint” (1905).  The Court 
highlighted the appropriateness for the common good to outweigh individual liberties in 
circumstances where the loss is minimal and the risk of harm is extremely small 
(Jacobson 1905).   
In Zucht v. King, the Supreme Court held that regulations that were reasonable 
and created little risk of harm while promoting a legitimate state interest do not confer 
arbitrary power, even if exercised by local officials (1922).  Meanwhile, Boone v. 
Boozeman established that as long as the immunization required had a real and 
substantial relation to the protection of the public’s health, the regulation was valid 
(2002).  Little, if anything, is mentioned in these cases of the necessity to provide 
exemptions for those who wish to avoid vaccination due to their personal beliefs, sincere 
or otherwise.  In fact, the Supreme Court, in Prince v. Massachusetts, stated that the right 
to practice religion freely does not also grant one the right to expose the community to 
communicable diseases (1944).  Indeed, it seems unclear why even personal, nonreligious 
beliefs would grant someone the right to expose others to infection.   
The Supreme Court of Mississippi would most likely reject Antommaria’s 
proposal for exemptions, just as it rejected the exemption policy in Brown v. Stone 
(1979).  In this case the court held that allowing exemptions did not avoid violations of 
the First Amendment but instead violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment (Brown 1979).  The court felt that the policy of allowing exemptions for 
certain individuals discriminated against those who did not have objections and, 
therefore, underwent the risks of vaccination for the benefit of themselves and others 
(Brown 1979).  This type of result conforms to prior doctrine that states that individuals 
cannot avoid complying with valid and neutral laws of general applicability simply 
because the conduct it requires does not comply with their religious beliefs (Employment 
Division 1990). 
After careful examination of the decades of compulsory vaccination doctrine 
discussing exemptions for personal beliefs, the question is whether they are truly 
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necessary and worth the difficulties and hindrances that are inherent with their use?  The 
desire to incorporate mechanisms for allowing conscientious objections, both religious 
and nonreligious, is certainly laudable and understandable.  It is difficult to grasp the 
ethical justification for forcing individuals to succumb to medical procedures against 
their beliefs, and is anathema to the individual liberties that play a primary role in the 
foundation of this country’s Constitution.  Yet, under this same umbrella of embracing 
and protecting autonomy, courts have again and again maintained that exemptions are 
unnecessary and likely unconstitutional themselves.  While the authors claim to be 
utilizing an ethical framework for public health, the courts’ focus on public health is what 
has unfailingly led them to an opposing conclusion that exemptions are not required. 
Ethics and the law are certainly different, and do not necessarily require the same 
analysis.  Yet, in a country where individual liberty and autonomy are held in such high 
value and protected in almost any way possible, it seems worth mentioning the lack of 
judicial requirements for exemptions and the reasoning behind it.  The practicalities of 
implementing the author’s suggested assessments of conscientious exemption requests 
further suggest the necessity to heed the warnings of the judicial precedent.  Truly 
following the principles of public health would intimate that while individuals have rights 
of autonomy and liberty, those rights cannot endanger the health and wellbeing of others 
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